CAPITALISM, KINSHIP, AND FRAUD The Case of Bernie Madoff by Ortner, Sherry B
UCLA
UCLA Previously Published Works
Title
CAPITALISM, KINSHIP, AND FRAUD The Case of Bernie Madoff
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1kf0t8qz
Journal
SOCIAL ANALYSIS, 63(3)
ISSN
0155-977X
Author
Ortner, Sherry B
Publication Date
2019-09-01
DOI
10.3167/sa.2019.630301
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Social Analysis, Volume 63, Issue 3, Autumn 2019, 1–23 © Berghahn Books
doi:10.3167/sa.2019.630301 • ISSN 0155-977X (Print) • ISSN 1558-5727 (Online)
Capitalism, Kinship, and Fraud
The Case of Bernie Madoff 
Sherry B. Ortner
Abstract: Investment broker Bernie Madoff ran what is still considered 
the largest Ponzi scheme in history, defrauding thousands of investors 
over a 20-year period of more than $20 billion. He worked his game 
almost entirely through kinship connections—relatives, friends of rela-
tives, and relatives of friends. The relationship between kinship and 
capitalism has drawn renewed attention by anthropologists, part of a 
broader effort to rethink capitalism not as a free-standing ‘economy’ 
but as deeply embedded in a wide range of social relations. In this 
article I use the Madoff case to illustrate, and develop further, several 
aspects of the kinship/capitalism connection. I also consider briefly 
the boundary between fraud and ‘legitimate’ capitalism, which many 
economic historians consider a fuzzy boundary at best.
Keywords: boundaries, capitalism, feminist perspective, fraud, Jewish 
community, kinship, patriarchy
In December 2008, in the midst of what many have called the greatest American 
financial crisis since the crash of the stock market in 1929, a securities broker 
named Bernard L. Madoff (MAY-doff) was arrested for conducting what is now 
considered the biggest Ponzi scheme in history. It involved the largest amount 
of money ever seen in such a scheme, went on longer than any other known 
scheme, and involved more victims over more of the globe than any scheme on 
record. In terms of sheer scale and scope, it is considered among the ‘10 biggest 
frauds in recent U.S. history’ (Forbes n.d.), second only to the massive fraud of 
Enron Corporation in 2001.
Although at one level the Madoff case is extreme, at another level theo-
rists and historians have argued that fraud is an intrinsic part of the history 
of capitalism. In his study on counterfeiting, for example, historian Stephen 
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Mihm (2007: 11) goes so far as to say: “At its core, capitalism was little more 
than a confidence game” (see also Balleisen 2017). Economic historian Ian 
Klaus (2014) argues that the entire history of capitalism can be understood as 
an evolving cycle in which the emergence of new markets and new financial 
instruments facilitated the emergence of new frauds, which provoked the emer-
gence of new regulatory mechanisms that then provoked new opportunities 
for fraudulent activity and so on, round and round. Extending that argument, 
economic sociologist Wolfgang Streeck (2016: 70) contends that neo-liberalism 
is only the most recent phase of this cycle, but it may be the one that breaks the 
system entirely: “Fraud and corruption have forever been companions of capi-
talism. But there are good reasons to believe that with the rise of the financial 
sector to economic dominance, they have become … pervasive … Finance is 
an ‘industry’ where innovation is hard to distinguish from rule-bending or rule-
breaking.” In short, there is never a clear boundary between legitimate capital-
ism and fraud. The legal system attempts to draw a line at any given time, but 
that line is always a moving target. 
A Ponzi scheme is one kind of financial fraud that is actually very simple. 
Posing as a financial broker or trader of some kind (which Madoff actually 
was), the fraudster invites people to ‘invest’ in stocks, bonds, or other financial 
instruments. Pocketing their money, the fraudster does not invest it in any-
thing, but pays the investors some kind of ‘returns’, such as dividends, interest, 
or capital gains. These returns come not from the ongoing or rising value of the 
investments, but from the money ‘invested’ by later victims. As long as these 
returns keep coming in, the victims remain complacent. But when they go to 
withdraw their money, it is not there.
The Ponzi scheme falls into a particular category known as ‘affinity fraud’, 
so called because the fraudster works the scheme largely through his (and it is 
usually ‘his’) personal networks. The Madoff case is a particularly rich, com-
plex, and almost baroque example of this point as Madoff had relatives on both 
sides of the line, as it were. Some of his victims were his relatives, but at the 
same time he enriched other relatives and employed a significant number in his 
(legitimate) business, including his brother and sons. But the affinity networks 
for the fraud went beyond kin, as Madoff (himself Jewish) famously worked 
a large part of his game through the broader Jewish community and swindled 
many Jewish individuals, foundations, charities, and educational institutions. 
The Madoff case also stands out for the extreme reactions to his crimes. He 
was reviled in terms that characterized him as inhuman—as a ‘monster’—and 
that characterized his deeds as virtually demonic. The judge who presided over 
his trial said in his summary that Madoff’s crimes were “extraordinarily evil” 
(Kirtzman 2010: 269) and sentenced him to 150 years in prison.
I should say at the outset that all of the data in the article have been drawn 
from published sources. Ideally, I would have preferred to conduct my own 
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ethnographic research on this subject, but that was not possible in this case. 
Fortunately, the material on the Madoff case is very rich, both in quantity and in 
depth of access to key sources. Because the case was so notorious, it generated 
a large number of books and articles. The primary text is The Wizard of Lies: 
Bernie Madoff and the Death of Trust by award-winning journalist Diana Hen-
riques (2011), which draws on large numbers of interviews with insiders.1 There 
are also several useful documentary films, also based on first-hand sources 
(especially Prosserman 2010). Finally, there are several first-person accounts by 
members of the immediate Madoff family (Sandell 2011; Mack and Jones 2011), 
and a televised interview with Madoff’s wife (see Curran 2011), so again we get 
to hear the voices of many of the primary players in this drama. 
I will begin by sketching out the numbers on the more material side of the 
fraud: the money, the time involved, and the number of victims. I will also pro-
vide a brief profile of the victims. But I will spend most of the article exploring 
the various dimensions of the inclusion and/or exploitation of kin. My interest 
here is to go beyond the moral revulsion, which I certainly share, and to use 
the case to engage with several important new lines of anthropological work on 
the continuing life of kinship relations within the modern capitalist economy, 
and on the workings of patriarchal power and authority within both kinship 
and capitalism.
Numbers and Beyond
Of course, we must start with the money. At the time of his arrest, Madoff 
mentioned a figure of $50 billion, which was incredible even to people in the 
world of high finance. Several conversations are quoted in which the speaker 
says, “$50 billion,” and the hearer says, “$50 million?” and the speaker says, 
“No, billion, with a ‘b’” (Sandell 2011: 179, 182, 185). As it turned out, the 
figure was closer to $64 billion, although that amount included the imaginary 
gains in all the accounts, which nonetheless had real effects (e.g., people paid 
taxes on those ‘gains’). The total in real money was ‘only’ about $20 billion 
(Henriques 2011: 327). 
The second consideration is time. The fact that the fraud went on as long as 
it did is another major part of the notoriety of the case. In fact, nobody has ever 
been able to figure out exactly when it started. This matters in terms of defining 
which of Madoff’s assets were legitimately the property of himself and his fam-
ily, so Madoff had an interest in setting the starting point relatively late, some-
time in the late 1980s, although most observers are fairly certain that it started 
earlier. But even if we accept Madoff’s dating, the fact that the scheme did not 
become known until 2008 means that the fraud went on for at least 20 years 
without exposure, which is quite a long time for a scheme of this magnitude. 
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There are many reasons for this. One has to do with the alleged gullibility 
and/or greed of the investors—the idea that people simply were not paying 
attention or did not want to look too closely because they were profiting from 
the scheme. Another has to do with the failure of government regulation. An 
investment analyst named Harry Markopolous figured out the scam quite early 
in the game, and multiple times he notified the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), whose job it is to uncover and prosecute crimes like this. But 
the SEC either ignored Markopolous or sent in investigative teams that, for all 
intents and purposes, did not investigate (Prosserman 2010). Apparently, the 
SEC office was understaffed, in part because of government budget cutbacks, 
and in part because of a prevailing anti-regulatory climate, both of which are 
effects of the neo-liberal turn in American capitalism. In any event, the multiple 
failures of the SEC clearly extended the length of time of the fraud.
Next, we turn to the victims, and it is almost impossible to get an accurate 
number. By the end of 2010, over 16,500 claims were filed with Irving Picard, 
the financial trustee for the case (Henriques 2011: 327). More than 51,700 
claims were filed as of 31 April 2014 with the separate Department of Justice 
Madoff Victim Fund (McCoy 2014), but there is a great deal of overlap between 
the two numbers. And we do not know if every victim submitted a claim. 
Finally, going beyond the numbers, the profile of the victims was also part 
of the great scandal of the case. As already noted, Madoff swindled many rela-
tives and friends. The defrauding of kin will be central to the discussion of this 
article, and I will say much more about it below. He also swindled many Jew-
ish individuals, but the more notorious element here was the defrauding of a 
number of Jewish educational institutions (e.g., Yeshiva University) and Jewish 
charitable foundations, including the foundation of Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel, 
Holocaust witness and survivor. And then there are thousands of ‘ordinary 
people’, especially elderly people whose survival in retirement depended on 
the money they thought they had invested with Madoff. Although some of the 
‘victims’ were quite wealthy, and their victim status has been contested, the 
majority of the affected persons were of moderate means and had their liveli-
hoods deeply affected or in some cases completely wiped out.2
Summarizing here, the huge amounts of money, the length of time the 
fraud went on, the literally incalculable number of victims, and the distinctive 
profile of the victims—all of these would in themselves add up to making the 
Madoff case a major phenomenon in the annals of fraud. The Department of 
Justice official in charge of the Madoff Victim Fund is quoted as saying, “Other 
than the Gobi Desert and the polar icecaps, few places on earth seem to have 
escaped the scourge of this fraud … [it is] of epic and truly global proportions” 
(McCoy 2014).
But big as it is, that is only one side of the story. The other is what might 
be called the social relations of production of the fraud, especially the very 
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extensive range of involvement of family members and relatives in the case. This 
brings us to the endlessly complex relationship between kinship and capitalism.
Kinship and Capitalism
In the last decade or so, there has been a burgeoning of studies arguing persua-
sively for the ongoing relevance of kin relations for the workings of the capitalist 
economy.3 This trend may be traced to two somewhat distinct sources: a revival 
of interest in the work of Karl Polayni, and a line of feminist (re)thinking about 
capitalism. With respect to Polanyi, first, there has been a new focus on his 
distinction between ‘formalist’ and ‘substantivist’ perspectives on the economy 
(see Polanyi 1977; Streeck 2016). Formalist approaches to the economy—mostly 
by economists—treat it as a kind of free-standing object, ‘disembedded’ (a key 
Polanyi term) from the rest of social life and largely equivalent to the struc-
ture and functioning of ‘the market’. Substantivist perspectives, on the other 
hand, treat the economy as part of the larger social world. Polanyi (1977: 39) 
referenced, among other things, Malinowski’s research on the Kula ring as an 
example of a substantivist approach. Although the socially embedded economy 
has been primarily associated with ‘pre-modern’ societies, recent work in eco-
nomic anthropology (e.g., Appel et al. 2015; Hart et al. 2010; Ho 2009) argues 
for its relevance to understanding contemporary economies as well, including 
but not limited to capitalism. 
Along these lines, then, we have been seeing a burgeoning of ethnographic 
studies of economic formations and practices from a substantivist point of view 
(without necessarily using the term), which reveal their deep embeddedness 
in relations of family, kinship, marriage, gender, generation, and more (see, 
e.g., Ong 1999a, 1999c; Marcus and Hall 1992; McKinnon and Cannell 2013b; 
Yanagisako 2002, 2013). 
Converging with the Polanyi revival, we have seen the emergence of several 
specifically feminist-inspired lines of discussion that work from a similar posi-
tion. J. K. Gibson-Graham’s (1996) The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A 
Feminist Critique of Political Economy is an early example, which was picked up 
more recently by a group of anthropologists calling themselves the Gens collec-
tive, who have published a ‘feminist manifesto for the study of capitalism’ (Bear 
et al. 2015). Central to their project is an emphasis on ‘generativity’, on the ways 
in which capitalist value is produced and transformed in diverse sites of social 
life, including those normally excluded as ‘domestic’ or ‘private’ (Tsing 2015). Dis-
cussing, for example, the work of Thomas Piketty (2014) on wealth and inequal-
ity, they argue that “his findings provide overwhelming evidence … that class 
inequality cannot be understood or solved without attention to other structures of 
power, including those at work in the most intimate relations” (Bear et al. 2015).
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It is in fact the specifically feminist perspective that gives a new twist, or 
several, to the question of the relationship between capitalism and the ‘intimate 
relations’ of social life. Thus, another feminist angle on the kinship-capitalism 
nexus involves drawing questions of patriarchy into the mix. As developed 
more fully in some of my more recent work (e.g., Ortner 2014), patriarchy as 
a formation of power crosscuts kinship, capitalism, and indeed virtually any 
hierarchical social arrangement, such as the military. It is a generalized—and 
gendered—structure of dominance and authority that not only places men over 
women, but also senior men over junior men. Within kinship, it is vested in 
the authority of the father and in all types of (kin) relations modeled on that 
original familial form. Within capitalism, we see it at work in the hierarchies of 
corporations and the organization of workplaces.
Patriarchal power takes a number of different forms, some of which embody 
the more brutal aspects of the patriarchal role: harsh authority, domination and 
bullying, sexual harassment and rape—patriarchy as power rather than author-
ity. But patriarchy is also, and perhaps more commonly and insidiously, a kind 
of soft power, whereby the patriarch offers protection and care to those below 
him in exchange for their love, respect, and submission to his authority. It is 
patriarchy in this aspect that will be particularly relevant to the present article.
Along with patriarchy, a third line of feminist thinking on the kinship-
capitalism nexus emphasizes the darker sides of kinship, the many ways in 
which the expected solidarity of kin relations are routinely violated. In her now 
classic work on Italian family businesses, Sylvia Yanagisako (2002) explores at 
length both the solidarities of kin within these businesses, and the many fault 
lines in those relationships. She concludes: “Betrayal and estrangement are as 
much a regular part of the organizational dynamics of Como family capitalism 
as are trust and kinship solidarity” (ibid.: 114). Citing Yanagisako among oth-
ers, Kathryn Goldfarb and Caroline Schuster (2016: 1–2), in turn, develop a 
similar line of discussion, focusing on the frequent “dis-alignment, exclusion, 
and non-mutuality” of kin relations. Addressing particularly the relationship 
between kinship and capitalism (and other forms of value production), they 
argue that “the gaps of non-mutuality, exclusion, and difference are especially 
apparent in contexts where kinship production has collided with value produc-
tion” (ibid.: 4).
Returning, then, to the Madoff case, we will see the many ways in which 
these various aspects of the kinship-capitalism relationship played into both 
the public scandal and private pain of the case. I will look first at the concept 
of relationships as ‘generative’, as a context that produced and reproduced 
value (both relational and material) on both sides of the link. I will then 
discuss the patriarchal aspects of the Madoff case, showing how patriarchy 
cut across kinship and capitalism in ways both productive and destructive. 
Finally, I follow the question of betrayal into a deeper level of subjectivity 
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through a close reading of some writings left behind by Madoff’s son Mark 
before he committed suicide.
The Kinship-Capital Nexus as Generative
Bernard L. Madoff Investments Securities (hereafter BLMIS) occupied three 
floors of what is called the Lipstick Building in New York City. The nineteenth 
floor housed the trading floor of his legitimate business, BLMIS proper, and the 
eighteenth floor the tech and other support offices. The seventeenth floor con-
tained the offices of his private ‘investment advisory business’; in other words, 
it was the base camp of his Ponzi scheme. Here the paperwork was generated 
that led ‘investors’ to think their investments were safe and profitable. In the-
ory, the people on the upper floors knew nothing about what was occurring on 
the seventeenth floor. Madoff claimed to have maintained a ‘firewall’ between 
the two businesses, and although many people later would doubt that, for the 
most part, it seems to have been true.4
I will come back to the firewall issue in the next section, but here I want 
to show how Madoff creatively deployed every imaginable form of kinship—
‘blood’ relatives, in-laws, relatives of in-laws, fictive kin, and metaphoric family 
relations—to make money via both his legitimate business and his fraud. There 
are two points here. The first has to do with the nature of kinship itself, which 
Marshall Sahlins (2013: ix) has defined as “mutuality of being,” that is, the 
idea that kin “participate intrinsically in each other’s existence.” Or as David 
Schneider (1968: 65–66) famously puts it in his study of American kinship, kin 
are people among whom there is a relationship of “diffuse, enduring solidarity,” 
an expectation of trust and reliability. As just discussed, these views of kinship 
have been challenged, or at least modified, in recent work, but they clearly fit 
well with the logic of the Madoff case. The second point is about the intertwined 
generativity of kinship and capital: Madoff produced not only his capital via kin-
ship relations, but his kinship relations via transfers of capital. 
We begin with the legitimate business. Madoff actively and extensively 
included his close kin in Bernard L. Madoff Investments Securities. His younger 
brother, Peter, was the chief compliance officer and day-to-day manager of 
BLMIS, and his two sons, Mark and Andrew, were traders. Peter’s wife, Marion, 
was on the payroll, and Peter’s daughter Shana took a law degree and became 
the company’s compliance attorney. Peter’s son worked briefly in the firm 
before his death from leukemia. Charlie Wiener, the son of Bernie and Peter’s 
sister Sondra, also worked at one point in the firm (Ross 2015: 180). 
In addition to the employment of relatives, BLMIS maintained a ‘family’ 
type of environment for all its employees, in terms of the atmosphere in the 
workplace and in more material terms as well: “To most of his employees 
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[Madoff] was the amiable patriarch, walking the trading floor with a cardigan 
sweater over his shirt and tie, slapping backs and making small talk. When an 
employee fell behind on his mortgage, Bernie paid it off. When another got 
married, he paid for the honeymoon” (Kirtzman 2010: 104). Employees also 
had an unusual degree of employment security: “‘It was the kind of company 
you knew you could work at for the rest of your life,’ said one. ‘No one ever 
got laid off’” (ibid.: 106). 
Turning then to the fraud, ‘family’ in a more extended sense ramified well 
beyond the confines of the BLMIS offices. These networks of relationship were 
established by means of a fractal chain of connections: friends of relatives, and 
relatives of friends. Many of the key connections worked through marriage and 
in-law relations. Madoff’s father-in-law, an accountant named Saul Alpern, 
was a major figure in the launching of Madoff’s career, lending him money at 
a critical point in time, and forming what amounted to the first ‘feeder fund’, 
consolidating small investments into larger bundles, which he channeled to 
Madoff for a fee. Alpern also praised Madoff to his three brothers, all of whom 
invested in Madoff for themselves and for their children. Alpern worked with 
two other accountants who also started a major feeder fund. The sister of one 
of the accountants married a man named Jeffry Picower who became one of 
Madoff’s biggest investors.5 The stepfather of Mark Madoff’s second wife was 
an investor, and so were the parents of Madoff’s lawyer. The son-in-law of 
another big investor became Madoff’s go-between at the Palm Beach Country 
Club. And so it went, on and on.
Madoff’s network exhibits some interesting characteristics from the point of 
view of standard American kinship patterns. Americans are known for not hav-
ing large kinship networks (Schneider 1968).6 Because most nuclear families 
are small, most people have relatively few aunts, uncles, and cousins. But we 
learn from Schneider that when Americans enlarge their networks, they tend 
to do so by adding relatives of in-laws rather than more distant blood relatives 
(ibid.: 69). This was one of Madoff’s strategies: in-laws became extremely 
important connectors in the network, generating new webs. We also see the 
role of friendship in creating further kinship-based links. Thus, kin brought in 
friends, and those friends brought in their kin. 
And then there was one more category of ‘relative’ in the Madoff case: 
fictive kin. Madoff was very close with two extremely wealthy older Jewish 
businessmen, Norman F. Levy and Carl J. Shapiro. Both were described as 
“surrogate fathers” to Madoff (Seal 2009). While he lavished them with luxuri-
ous gifts and paid them very high ‘returns’ on their investments, in the end he 
defrauded both of them of enormous amounts of money. In fact, Shapiro was 
his largest single ‘investor’, with an initial investment of $250 million and a 
second $250 million solicited by Madoff as his ship was sinking, a few nights 
before he confessed. 
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We see, then, that kinship not only facilitated Madoff’s fraud, but was the 
very essence of it. Every possible type of kin relationship was activated—blood 
kin (children, brother, brother’s children), in-laws and a widely ramifying net-
work through in-laws, and even fictive kin, in the form of ‘surrogate fathers’. 
People at the outer edges of the network, or who came in through feeder funds, 
did not need to be related to, or trust, Madoff personally or even know him—
and many did not. But there were always kinship links no more than one or 
two degrees away, so that the whole network was infused with the aura of trust 
culturally associated with the very idea of kinship.
Madoff and the Jewish Community
As already noted, Madoff’s network of ‘investors’, at least in the US, was 
almost entirely drawn from the Jewish community, including both individu-
als and institutions. Ethnic ties have some of the same cultural characteristics 
as kinship. They are seen as based on blood and are therefore assumed to be 
‘natural’ and unbreakable, embodying a quality of trustworthiness and reli-
ability compared to relations with the ‘outside world’. Ethnicity is of course 
a vast and complex subject, and I will not try to theorize it here. For present 
purposes, I simply want to emphasize its parallels with kinship, the fact that 
both are culturally assumed to involve, in Sahlins’s terms, a mutuality of being. 
But in the context of fraud, that mutuality of being becomes dangerous for the 
members of the group. Madoff’s extensive purveyance of his fraud within the 
Jewish community was both a betrayal of the principles of ethnic solidarity 
within the group itself, and a kind of tainting of the community with his crimes 
vis-à-vis the outside world.
In Betrayal: The Life and Lies of Bernie Madoff, journalist Andrew Kirtzman 
(2010) describes in ethnographically rich detail the fallout of the Madoff fraud 
among the American Jewish community. He writes, for example, of Carl Sha-
piro, Madoff’s ‘surrogate father’, who was 95 years old at the time the fraud 
was uncovered. Shapiro had invested $500 million dollars in Madoff’s fund and 
thus took an enormous financial hit. But the revelation was also a personal and 
emotional blow, which he described as “like a knife in the heart” (ibid.: 245). 
Beyond the betrayal of personal relationships, there was also the betrayal 
of the Jewish community as a whole and of the principle of ethnic mutuality. 
For one thing, the Jewish ‘community’ was more than a metaphor of shared 
ethnicity. It was in many places an on-the-ground, face-to-face community, 
as in the Palm Beach country club where Madoff is estimated to have bilked 
one-third of the membership (Arvedlund 2009: 266). Further, the community 
viewed itself with pride as highly philanthropic, and was particularly aghast 
at the defrauding of charitable foundations and institutions. A Los Angeles 
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rabbi published an open letter to Madoff in Newsweek: “You betrayed charities 
whose good works you have extinguished in an afternoon. These betrayals are 
epic in their scope and dazzling in their utter lack of remorse or responsibility. 
There must be some new word invented to describe the way you have rede-
fined betrayal” (quoted in Ross 2015: 168).
In addition to painful feelings of betrayal, there was another sentiment 
widespread in the Jewish community, a fear of exposure to vilification and 
hatred by the outside world. Given the nature of the crime, there was fear of 
reviving the old stereotype of Jews as inherently greedy (Arvedlund 2009: 276). 
As one of the victims who spoke at Madoff’s trial said, “Nobody has done more 
to reinforce the ugly stereotype that all we care about is money” (Henriques 
2011: 276; see also Ross 2015: 168). As the rabbi of a Palm Beach temple stated, 
“That’s part of the great tragedy of this … because it reinforced the prejudice 
and the hatred that many people have toward Jews” (quoted in Ross 2015: 
168). And indeed there was an uptick in anti-Semitic postings on the Internet 
that bore out such fears (Henriques 2011: 213). 
The Madoff Patriarchal Family
We earlier looked at kinship in its generative mode as a network of relations 
based on trust and mutuality that allowed Madoff to work his scam on an 
unprecedented scale. We have seen what happened within the Jewish commu-
nity when the scam was exposed: people not only lost a great deal of money, 
but felt deeply betrayed and socially exposed. As we turn to the Madoff family, 
we will see all the same patterns, but with a twist: the family is not a network 
of kin and/or ethnic ties spread out in time and space, but a particular structur-
ing of kinship relations involving hierarchy, power, and authority. It is one ver-
sion of that broader structure of gendered social relations we call ‘patriarchy’.
Patriarchy is, as discussed briefly earlier, a complex arrangement that takes 
a variety of forms (Ortner 2014). It is usually associated with the idea of male 
power over women, but this is not always its most prominent characteristic. For 
purposes of the present article, I will emphasize a different aspect, what I will 
call ‘the patriarchal contract’, by which I mean the unspoken agreement that 
the father agrees to protect all members of the family in exchange for submis-
sion to his authority. There is also a dimension of threat in this arrangement: 
the contract is backed by a kind of ‘or else’ clause, and the patriarch always has 
some degree of power as well as authority. But in a well-functioning patriarchal 
entity, the appearance/acceptance of benevolent authority is maintained, and 
the arrangement works on care and respect as much as on threat and fear.
The key term in this definition is ‘protect’. The patriarch is meant to protect 
family members materially, that is, to protect them from want and need. But 
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there is also a range of social threats from which the patriarch offers protection, 
including violence, hatred, harassment, humiliation, and so forth, emanating 
from both specific Others (often themselves vilified)7 and the broader gaze of a 
judgmental society. There is of course enormous variation in the ways in which 
this is organized and the language in which it is framed, but a key dimension of 
the patriarchal contract is the patriarch’s guarantee of protection from negative 
Others, however defined, in exchange for submission to his authority.
With these points in mind, I turn to the patriarchal dynamics of the Madoff 
family, drawing here on all the available sources, but especially on two insider 
accounts—one by Stephanie, the widow of Madoff’s son Mark (see Mack and 
Jones 2011), and one commissioned by Madoff’s other son, Andrew, and his 
fiancée Catherine (see Sandell 2011). Both books were written within a year or 
two after Madoff’s confession, and there is a great deal of anger and hostility 
expressed among the various parties. Yet the portrait of the family that emerges 
from the various accounts is remarkably consistent, and I take that as a reason-
able indicator of ethnographic accuracy.
The Madoff family (‘Bernie’, his wife Ruth, and their sons Mark and Andrew) 
was an almost picture-book example of a patriarchal family. By all accounts, 
the four of them were very close. Madoff and Ruth were close as a couple,8 and 
as parents they were close to their sons. When the boys were growing up, the 
family always went out of town on holidays, and they took all their vacations 
together. Madoff and Ruth were described as easy-going, loving parents, and 
Madoff was very generous with his money. After the sons graduated from col-
lege, Madoff took them into his legitimate business (BLMIS), and gave each 
son his own trading operation. The brothers worked very closely with each 
other, and they enjoyed a good working relationship with their father. This 
arrangement lasted for more than 20 years. 
Madoff thus ‘protected’ his family from harm in all the classic patriarchal 
ways, providing them with material resources and what would seem to have 
been reliable and loving parental care. In this case, however, there was an addi-
tional need for protection. Madoff had to protect the family from the fallout of 
his own criminal activities. One way he seems to have tried to do this was by 
creating boundaries.
I noted earlier that Madoff went to great lengths to keep his legitimate 
business, located on the nineteenth floor of the Lipstick Building, completely 
cordoned off from his fraudulent operations located on the seventeenth floor. It 
will also be recalled that he employed many relatives, including his sons, in his 
legitimate business, and more broadly strove to run his legitimate business in a 
‘family’ kind of way. While we may think of the barrier between the nineteenth 
and seventeenth floors as shielding Madoff and his fraud from visibility, there 
are also strong indications that he saw the barrier as shielding his relatives, and 
especially his sons, from accusations of complicity in his criminality.
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Less remarked on, but I would say equally relevant, is the way that Madoff 
drew a kind of boundary around his nuclear family. According to his wife Ruth, 
Madoff resisted socializing with even his closest relatives outside of work, 
including Ruth’s sister and her family, his own sister and her family, and even 
his brother Peter and his family. Ruth is quoted as saying, “He never wanted 
to do anything he didn’t want to do—and for the most part, he didn’t ever 
want to see family” (Sandell 2011: 50). Many people, of course, do not wish to 
socialize with their closest kin. In this case, however, I would suggest another 
interpretation—namely, that Madoff associated the world of kinship beyond 
his immediate family with his criminality. The vast network of kin, in-laws, 
friends of kin, and friends of in-laws was the universe of Madoff’s illegality. 
Creating a boundary around the nuclear family may have been another way of 
protecting them.
These boundaries at both work and home can be read at multiple levels. 
I see them in part as drawing upon, and reinforcing in material practice, the 
existing cultural boundaries noted earlier between kinship and capitalism, 
family and market, domestic and public. I will return to these themes in the 
conclusion, but here I want to continue to trace the effects on the Madoff fam-
ily of the violation of cultural boundaries on the kinship side of the equation, 
which up to this point had been held together by the ‘patriarchal contract’—the 
classic combination of patriarchal power/authority and filial respect.
Cutting Kinship
Let us return to Marshall Sahlins’s (2013: ix) definition of kinship as a “mutual-
ity of being,” in which persons defined as kin “participate intrinsically in each 
other’s existence.” This is of course only one definition of kinship, but one that 
is highly relevant to the present case. Sahlins expands: “Like the biblical sins 
of the father that descend on the sons,” in kinship as mutuality of being “what 
one person does or suffers also happens to others” (ibid.: 2). The relevance to 
the Madoff case is immediately clear: As we will see in this section, Madoff’s 
family suffered greatly for his sins, and thus went to great lengths to sever 
almost every shred of kinship that might obtain between him and them. 
The patriarchal contract in the Madoff family/business may be seen as 
weakening earlier, with Madoff getting older and his sons seeking to clarify 
the question of succession of the businesses. I follow here Sylvia Yanagisako’s 
(2002) discussion of succession in family businesses, which is almost always a 
point of tension, both between fathers and children, usually sons, and among 
the children/sons themselves. One early manifestation of the problem of suc-
cession in the Madoff case was Madoff’s refusal to rename the company. The 
sons repeatedly asked him to rename it from Bernard L. Madoff Investment 
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Securities to simply Madoff Securities, which would have implicitly recognized 
their growing roles in the business, as well as the important role of Madoff’s 
brother Peter. But Madoff always refused (Sandell 2011: 62). More directly on 
the question of succession, at a certain point the sons began asking their father 
to explain his “private investment advisory business” to them, as they would 
be responsible for it if/when something happened to him. But again, he always 
refused. This latter became a major and ongoing point of friction between 
Madoff and his sons (ibid.: 65; see also Mack and Jones 2011: 81–82).
But of course, there was not to be any succession. Madoff’s scheme was 
exposed in 2008 during the near-crash of the stock market. ‘Investors’ began 
pulling out their money, and Madoff could not cover all the withdrawals. He 
confessed to his brother Peter, and then to his wife and two sons, that it was 
“a fraud, just one enormous lie, ‘basically, a giant Ponzi scheme’” (Henriques 
2011: 8). He broke down and wept. He stated his intention to take a week 
before turning himself in, during which time he would distribute money to 
deserving relatives, friends, and workers. Nobody objected at the time, but the 
sons stormed out of the meeting.
Their lives were turned upside down. They were under suspicion for years 
as possible accomplices to Madoff’s crimes.9 All their assets were frozen, and 
they could not conduct normal transactions of daily life such as writing a check 
or charging a purchase. They were hounded relentlessly by the press. Two 
years later Mark would commit suicide, and I will return to his story below. 
Andrew managed to keep his life together for some time, but was consumed 
with rage over Madoff’s actions, which he described as “a betrayal of biblical 
proportions” (Sandell 2011: 247). He is quoted in a later conversation with Ruth 
as asking rhetorically whether Madoff had any guilt or remorse for what he 
did, and for its impact on him and Mark, and rejects the possibility absolutely: 
“In the last few years, all he was doing was using me as a shield. If you saw a 
war criminal grab a child and hold the child in front of him while he was being 
shot at, you would call that person an incomprehensible monster” (ibid.: 328). 
Andrew’s language here is interesting in light of the question of patriarchal 
protection of the family. Andrew reverses the direction of protection, seeing 
Madoff as using his sons to protect himself rather than the other way around. 
Madoff is a monster, from Andrew’s point of view, not only in his apparently 
complete lack of conscience, but also, it seems, for his perversion of the ‘natu-
ral’ patriarchal order.
The sons responded to their father’s betrayal with a series of counter-betray-
als. On the day of his confession to his family, they went home, immediately 
called their lawyers, and proceeded to turn their father in to the FBI. Part of 
the reason for this was legal: the lawyers advised the sons that if they knew 
Madoff was still distributing his illegal gains and did nothing, they would 
legally become accomplices to the crime. In other words, once he confessed, 
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they more or less had to turn him in. But this does not explain the ongoing and 
ultimately permanent nature of the break after that. The sons subsequently 
refused to co-sign his bail bond. And they never spoke to their father again.
But that was not the end of their cutting of kin ties. Their mother Ruth did 
not initially plan to sever ties with Madoff. As she later told Morley Safer in a 
Sixty Minutes interview, “I never thought of leaving. I don’t know why I didn’t, 
I just knew this man for so long, whom I loved for so many years. I didn’t 
know what else to do but stay there” (in Curran 2011). Thus, when Madoff 
went down and Ruth remained loyal, the sons cut her off too. When she sent 
them some of her jewelry, they turned it in to the FBI. When she asked them 
to co-sign Madoff’s bail bond, they were enraged by the request and refused to 
sign. They were furious that she remained in touch with Madoff after he went 
to prison and visited him there. After his first suicide attempt, Mark focused 
much of the blame for it on Ruth, and he gave her an ultimatum: either she 
would cut Madoff off completely or she would be banned from all future con-
nection with family members, including her beloved grandchildren.
Ruth did eventually cut Madoff off because she could not tolerate the loss 
of her sons and grandchildren. This too infuriated the sons as she did not do it 
primarily out of moral condemnation of Madoff. After Mark committed suicide, 
Andrew partially blamed Ruth, and Mark’s widow Stephanie refused to let 
Ruth attend Mark’s memorial service. As the years went by, there was a certain 
amount of reconciliation between Ruth and Andrew’s family, but she contin-
ued to be “denied access to Mark and Stephanie’s children” (Sandell 2011: 32).
Because Madoff had betrayed them, and also because any association with 
him was socially and possibly legally toxic, the sons could only carry on (and 
eventually Mark could not) by severing all ties with Madoff completely and 
absolutely, including ties that would be felt to remain in force if their mother 
maintained her connection with him. Thus, they broke with their mother too, 
until she broke with their father. But even that was not enough. By then Mark 
was dead, and his widow continued to enforce cutting the ties to the grandchil-
dren. It was as if the kinship ties were transmitting Madoff’s evil qualities and 
had to be almost literally, materially, cut and broken.10
Madoff’s Evilness and Mark’s Suicide
As noted earlier, theorists, historians, and critics of capitalism all agree that 
corruption and fraud have been endemic to the history of capitalism from the 
outset. The Madoff case was striking, not only because of the scope and scale 
of the fraud, but because of the extensive involvement of kinship and ethnic 
ties. This captured the public imagination and raised the fraud to a level of 
moral and ethical condemnation not normally seen in such cases. These moral 
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and ethical issues are particularly central to understanding perhaps the most 
dramatic outcome of the case—the suicide of Madoff’s son Mark.
It will be recalled that Madoff was subjected to extreme moral condemna-
tion by the press and the public. He was described as a “monster” (Eren 2017: 
9), as “the Devil” (ibid.: 122); as a “financial serial killer” (Arvedlund and Roth 
2010: ii), as “Jekyll and Hyde” (Seal 2009), as the ‘Adolf Hitler of fraud’ (also 
shortened to ‘Madoff Hitler’),11 as the “Charles Manson of Ponzi crimes” (Eren 
2017: 119), and—again and again—as evil.12 What does it mean that Madoff is 
seen as evil in an almost biblical way?13
In his classic essay on religion, Clifford Geertz (1973) talks about the prob-
lem of evil as part of what he calls a problem of meaning, a condition in which 
one’s sense of the purpose of life and the comprehensibility of the world is 
undermined and radically destabilized. I will quote Geertz at length on the 
broad problem of meaning, which he sees as emerging from the threat of 
chaos: “There are at least three points where chaos—a tumult of events which 
lack not just interpretations but interpretability—threatens to break in upon 
man: at the limits of his analytic capacities, at the limits of his powers of endur-
ance, and at the limits of his moral insight. Bafflement, suffering, and a sense 
of intractable ethical paradox are all, if they become intense enough or are 
sustained long enough, radical challenges to the proposition that life is compre-
hensible and that we can, by taking thought, orient ourselves effectively within 
it (ibid.: 100; emphasis in original). Let us focus on one element of this broader 
package, the problem of “intractable ethical paradox” or, as Geertz says later, 
the problem of evil (ibid.: 105–106). 
I want to propose that this is precisely what Madoff provoked and why he is 
perceived as evil. How could he swindle his own relatives? How could he swin-
dle his own ethno-religious community? How could he swindle Elie Wiesel, the 
great moral witness of the Holocaust? How could he take the money from chari-
table foundations specifically created to do good in the world? And finally, how 
could he put his own wife, brother, and sons in harm’s way and destroy their 
lives? For the vast majority of observers, it is all beyond comprehension, given 
the basic moral assumptions of our culture about kinship, ethnic solidarity, sup-
port for the common good, and care of one’s family. Andrew Madoff called his 
father an ‘incomprehensible monster’, and I am suggesting here that the word 
‘incomprehensible’ is as important as the word ‘monster’. If one looks at all the 
language reviling Madoff, it is not just the epithets that strike one, but the lan-
guage of the impossibility of reconciling his behavior not only with the person 
he appeared to be, but with the fundamental ethical assumptions of our culture. 
As people said over and over again, his acts were incomprehensible, unimagi-
nable, unthinkable—precisely what Geertz meant by a problem of meaning.
Most people, or at least people in reasonably comfortable situations, man-
age to deal with the pain and contradictions of life, whether with the help of 
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religion (which is what Geertz was writing about), or love or drugs—or all of 
the above and more. But several of Madoff’s victims committed suicide, includ-
ing Mark, and we may take them as having been overwhelmed by the impos-
sibility of dealing with the moral, emotional, and practical impact of Madoff’s 
crimes. Here I want to look at the accounts of Mark’s psychological decline, as 
the language he used in that period fits precisely with this argument about the 
ways in which Madoff created for at least some people the sense of ‘intractable 
ethical paradox’, or in other words, the problem of evil. We will see that Mark 
simply could not comprehend, reconcile, or, in the vernacular, wrap his mind 
around the contradictions of his father’s behavior.
In one account, Mark is quoted as repeatedly asking unanswerable ques-
tions about his father’s deeds: “How can a parent do this to his children? I just 
don’t understand” (in Sandell 2011: 264). Or again, “My whole life was a lie. 
My father is a scumbag, so who knows if anything he ever said was true. Who 
even knows if he loved me?” (ibid.: 273). In the other account, Mark’s widow 
Stephanie quotes in full the first few pages of a book Mark began to write and 
never finished. In it, he starts with another question, which is also another 
statement of his own incomprehension: “My own father has stolen my life from 
me … How do I explain to my children what I do not understand myself?” (in 
Mack and Jones 2011: 210). And then he focuses on what he clearly takes to 
be the central paradox of his experience: “The man who had taught me the 
importance of integrity had just told me that he was a thief” (ibid.: 207). Or 
again, at greater length: “My childhood was normal. I was taught right from 
wrong. Both of my parents were always there for me and both helped make 
me into the person that I am today. I was raised to be, and still am, a good and 
honest person” (ibid.: 208). 
In other words, it was not just that his father had loved him and cared for 
him and later betrayed him. This was where the breach of the patriarchal con-
tract came in. It went further and deeper. While his father had taught Mark 
right from wrong and raised him to be an ethical person, he himself then 
turned out to be a thief and a scumbag. Mark was clearly never able to resolve 
or get past this paradox, and was ultimately overwhelmed by it.
Conclusions: Boundaries
From a theoretical point of view, capitalism is, and must be seen as, ‘embed-
ded’ in the wider world of social relations. But this does not mean there is an 
easy relationship between them since, from a cultural point of view, kinship 
and capitalism are supposed to be separate. The boundary, as it were, between 
domestic and public, family and business, kinship and contract is heavily 
policed and maintained in Western culture, law, and spatial arrangements. This 
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is precisely because social relations in the two domains are meant to operate 
on different principles—what Talcott Parsons calls the “communalistic” prin-
ciple of family life, versus the individualistic and competitive relations of the 
economy (quoted in McKinnon and Cannell 2013a: 7). 
It will immediately be objected that there are many forms of ‘family busi-
ness’ that mix kinship and capitalism in the US and globally, and that is cer-
tainly true (see, e.g., Colli 2003). But this does not mean that the cultural 
contradiction is absent; the question is always an empirical one. In Madoff’s 
case, his criminal activities brought those contradictions very close to the sur-
face. He wanted to run a family business, but also wanted to protect his family 
from the fallout of his criminality. Thus, he tried to reinforce the boundaries 
between the two. The more visible boundary was the one between his legiti-
mate business and his fraudulent business, spatialized as the firewall between 
the nineteenth and the seventeenth floors of the Lipstick Building. This was 
widely interpreted as protecting himself from discovery, and indeed his sons 
later saw it that way. But it seems equally plausible to view it as Madoff trying 
to protect his sons and other close kin, all of whom worked on the nineteenth 
floor, from knowledge of and contamination by his criminal activities.
The less visible boundary was the one around his nuclear family. As his 
wife Ruth commented, Madoff resisted socializing with any of his relatives out-
side of work. There are many ways to interpret this, and again many people do 
not necessarily want to socialize with their kin for various reasons. But in the 
Madoff case, I have suggested that this was another kind of boundary drawing. 
Outside his nuclear family, Madoff’s entire universe of kinship was associated 
in one way or another with his criminal activities, whether as enablers (witting 
or unwitting) or as victims. Thus, Madoff tried to maintain a kind of firewall 
here too, between his nuclear family and the rest of his kin.
In the end, the firewalls failed, and the family was damaged beyond repair. 
I have interpreted the endgame of the Madoff family in part as a breach of the 
patriarchal contract, a failure of the patriarch to protect his family from harm. 
His crimes were thus visited upon his wife and sons, whose kinship ties with 
Madoff had to be severed literally and absolutely.
There is one final boundary that needs to be addressed: the boundary 
between fraud and legitimate capitalism. As noted earlier, many observers view 
that boundary as quite fuzzy, seeing capitalism itself as a kind of con game. 
Technically, however, the boundary is supposed to be clear: fraud is illegal, 
and normal business practices are not. Yet, as has been widely noted, in the 
world of big business and big finance, even when fraud is uncovered, very few 
people are prosecuted, no less punished (Aliber and Kindleberger 2015: 164). 
Legal writer Jesse Eisinger (2017: 233) brings the point to bear specifically on 
the Madoff case: “By 2015, the government had prosecuted some of [Madoff’s] 
colleagues and accountants. But what about Madoff’s enablers on Wall Street?” 
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Madoff had been banking enormous sums of money with J.P.Morgan for years, 
and memos show that suspicions had been raised within the bank but never 
acted upon. After the fraud broke, the bank was investigated but ultimately 
reached what Eisinger sees as a relatively cheap financial settlement in the 
case, with no admission of guilt and no individual executives being prosecuted. 
The bank took the position that because so many different people within the 
firm handled Madoff’s accounts, no single individual knew enough to recog-
nize what was going on (ibid.: 234).
I close with this emphasis on boundaries as a way of pulling together the 
various pieces of the discussions in this article. Since at least the 1970s, with 
the dawn of the neo-liberal economy, theorists, historians, and ethnographers 
have been working to rethink capitalism as a massive force in our world. One 
important direction in this work has been the attempt to rethink capitalism 
in relation to things from which it has been artificially cut off theoretically, in 
this case, relations of kinship. I have thus used the Madoff family/business as 
a case to bring to light some of the dynamics that are set in motion when the 
connections between kinship and capitalism are explicit: the ways in which the 
sentiments of kinship (and ethnicity) can be mobilized in favor of capital accu-
mulation; the ways in which patriarchal relations command and sustain the 
loyalties of both family and business; and the ways in which financial crime 
becomes unbearable personal betrayal when kinship and capital are mixed.
At the same time I have emphasized that the division between the world of 
kinship and the world of capital has not been simply theoretically imposed on 
the data. It emerges from a cultural distinction that underlies both the theory 
and the data. The ‘solidarity’ and ‘mutuality’ of kinship are, from a cultural 
point of view, supposed to be kept separate and protected from the coldness 
and calculation of ‘the market’. The Madoff case, and especially the suicide 
of Mark Madoff, allows us to see some of the seismic consequences that can 
ensue from mixing the two. Of course, the Madoff case is extreme, due to the 
criminality. On the other hand, I think we must take seriously economic his-
torians’ insistence that such criminality is rarely bounded off clearly from the 
rest of capitalism itself.
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Notes
 1. For a film based on this book, see Levinson (2017).
 2. In the aftermath of the case, financial trustee Picard divided Madoff clients into 
‘net winners’ and ‘net losers’. He tried to ‘claw back’ some of the winnings 
from the net winners and compensate the net losers. Needless to say, this was 
only possible up to a point, and very few people were satisfied with the results 
(Arvedlund and Roth 2010).
 3. I am using David Harvey’s (2005: 159) definition of capitalism, which charac-
terizes our existing political-economic system as one that creates “accumula-
tion by dispossession.”
 4. I take no position on the involvement of Madoff’s family members in the fraud. 
Observers would later find it impossible to believe that the sons in particular 
were not involved, and that the wife was not at least knowledgeable. Thus, it 
is important to note that the wife and the sons were investigated extensively, 
but none of them was ever charged with, no less convicted of, any crime.
 5. Madoff subsequently surmised that Picower, alone among the investors, may 
have figured out the scam and intentionally played Madoff (Henriques 2011: 
134–135).
 6. Schneider’s (1968) study was largely of white, middle-class Americans. Read-
ers may object that Madoff, with all his money, was hardly middle class. But he 
came from a middle-class background, and by all accounts he seems to have 
remained strongly shaped by that culture. 
 7. As this point suggests, patriarchy always involves significant othering. It gener-
ates in-groups and out-groups (families, tribes, etc.) and constitutes an impor-
tant element of racial and ethnic difference, suspicion, and hatred. This point 
is developed in Ortner (n.d.).
 8. Madoff does not appear to have been a womanizer, but he did have a long-term 
affair during his marriage, which was revealed after the fraud was exposed 
(Weinstein 2009).
 9. Once again I make no presumption of the guilt or innocence of the sons. How-
ever, I note again that they were investigated at great length, but no charges 
were ever filed.
 10. Ruth eventually left New York and went to live with her sister Joan, who took 
her in despite the fact that Joan and her husband had also been fleeced by 
Madoff. The role of the women in this account, including Ruth and the two 
daughters-in-law, is very interesting but beyond the scope of the present article.
 11.  See Hirschfield (2009) for an analysis of comparisons being made to Hitler.
 12. While I claim no psychological expertise, the evidence suggests that the Jekyll 
and Hyde characterization may be closest to the truth. Madoff can be seen as 
a kind of split personality, both the genuinely good(-ish) father/boss and the 
completely conscienceless exploiter of kin and charity.
13. This is also one of the central questions of Colleen Eren’s (2017) book. Her 
primary answer is that Madoff became a stand-in for the broader financial 
disaster that began in 2008.
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